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“The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.” 
Sir Winston Churchill  
Speech at Harvard, 6 September 1943, in Onwards to Victory (1944) 
Abstract 
The goal of the article is to explore the evolution of original concept of knowledge economy 
based on science intensive production sectors toward service type economies which 
significantly changed the role of scientific research and technological innovation for 
economic growth. The paper argues that this transition is due not only to the structural 
changes in global production, but the theoretical evolution and paradigmatic shift of the 
concept of “knowledge economy” in general and “knowledge” in particular has played a 
significant role. The paper examines the different interpretation of knowledge within new 
types of intangible economies (e.g., new/Internet, weightless, service, creative, cultural 
economies) where knowledge is perceived to be generated not as a product of scientific 
research but as a service or creative activity and critically examined the role of scientific 
research in a service led knowledge economy. Additionally the paper argue how these 
phenomena, which marked the global economy in the last decades, enable the transition of the 
standard concept of knowledge economy originated from industrial production and 
manufacturing to a knowledge economy equalized with various types of expanding intangible 
economies, primarily those based on service and creative industries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of the knowledge economy is embedded in a extensive tradition of 
economic and social theories. The knowledge economy concept is rooted in theories ranging 
from information theory (Machlup, 1962) to the theories of post-industrialism (Bell, 1973), as 
well as in the ideas of Drucker who coined the terms “knowledge society” (Drucker, 1969). 
Despite the existence of a vast body of literature on the knowledge economy, a coherent 
definition of this concept does not appear to have emerged (Carlaw et al, 2006). The most 
common definition is the one established by the OECD (1996), which describes the 
“knowledge economy” very broadly as an economy that is directly based on the production, 
distribution and use of knowledge and information.  
Knowledge generated by scientific research in natural and technical sciences needs 
technological innovation and industry for its market exploitation. However, industrial 
production and technological innovation are in sharp decline, markets are saturated with 
industrial goods of all kinds while service activities continue to grow employing the rising 
share of workforce. Despite certain recovery of economic activities among the most 
developed members of the EU in 2013 (European Commission, 2013) and optimistic 
prognoses for 2015, there remains a common impression that the crisis has shaken trust in the 
ability of Europe’s political and economic systems to deliver balanced economic growth 
(European Commission, 2012).  
Differences in the levels of economic development within the EU persist despite the 
efforts made to support the convergence of less developed regions. These differences occur 
both when comparing countries and comparing regions in a country. Comparing the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS), differences arise. 
For the 28 countries of the EU this average is equal to 100: although in 2013 GDP per capita 
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in PPS for such countries like (e.g. Netherlands (131), Austria (128), and Sweden (127), 
significantly above the European average; for others, like for (e.g. Bulgaria (45), Romania 
(55), Croatia (61) and Latvia (64)) are well below.
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 There are many reasons for such differences; historic, economic, and cultural. But the 
question is not only about the causes of this economic diversification but about the 
mechanisms of the most effective convergence tools as well. Technology change and 
innovation based on knowledge and scientific research are claimed to be the most important 
causes of diversification and at the same time one of the best ways for further development.  
The changes of these original assumptions began with the disappointing results of 
Lisbon I (Kok, 2004) and moderate success of Lisbon II (European Commission 2010a; 
Johansson et al, 2007). The failure of the latter was attributed to the financial and economic 
crisis that hit Europe in 2008. However, it provided a boost for a new European agenda: the 
Europe 2020 Strategy and the Innovation Union as a flagship initiatives which is designed to 
deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth relay on a belief in the importance of 
innovation in development strategy. It is stated that: “Europe’s future economic growth and 
jobs will increasingly have to come from innovation in products, services and business 
models. This is why innovation has been placed at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy for 
growth and jobs!” It is recognized as a new beginning, a platform for new growth initiatives 
that will allow Europe to take advantage of this moment of transformation to recover from the 
global crisis in 2010. 
Conceptual and methodological approaches has been used to dealing with future of 
service economies are fairly diversified and includes both severe critics of its sustainably 
(Jansson, 2009; Oakley, 2004; Ketokivi, 2009, Wölfl, 2005; Solberg Søilen, 2012; Miles, 
                                                             
1 based on Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1 
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2005; Witt, 2013) as well as its acceptance as an inevitable future that may pass different 
scenarios (Gallouj at all, 2015) physiological adjustments in (slow) growth (Antonelli and 
Fassio, 2014) or can take different forms such as “creativity” economy which interrelates 
creativity, knowledge and innovating economies (Dubina, at all, 2012). 
The main research questions are: how has the original concept of knowledge based 
economy rooted in science intensive industries been equalized with the service economy 
where knowledge is understood not as activity of scientific research activity but as service or 
creative activity? How has the technological innovation in this process been exchanged for 
creativity and service activities as the driver of economy growth? And, is it possible transition 
of standard service economy often related to low-skills/wage jobs into “knowledge intensive 
service economy” (KISE) with higher proportion of high tech production and high-tech 
service sectors which could reconcile scientific research, technological innovation and service 
activities.   
This paper is a conceptual paper with a methodology relies on critical qualitative 
research approach which involve in-depth understanding and description of the nature of a 
phenomenon under consideration. The statistical data are used where available and 
appropriate to illustrate the presented challenges of current knowledge based economy 
dominated by services. 
For the purpose of exploring the established research questions, we examined in the 
second part of the paper the historical roots of knowledge economy with a view to consider 
the current stance knowledge economy in Europe. The third part discusses the evolution of the 
concept of knowledge economy that lead to the re-conceptualization of the knowledge 
economy which is discussed in the fourth part of the paper. The fifth part describes the 
changes in understanding the notion of “knowledge” within different types of emerging 
intangible economies which ended up in the concept of service economy as their common 
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denominator. The six part explores the challenges of service economy supported by available 
analyses and statistical data that can serve as a motivation for fostering service economy more 
oriented to knowledge intensive activities and high/medium technologies. Lastly, the main 
thesis are recapitulated to suggest reconsideration of the concept of knowledge economy 
which suits the growth path of service economy. 
2. Is the Knowledge-based Economy in Europe under Threat? 
 
In the key European strategic documents produced over the last decade, transitioning 
to a knowledge economy has been a primary goal of the EU members. The need for this 
transition first arose in the mid-1990s, when the balance of global economic power was 
disturbed and Europe started to face growing unemployment, slow economic growth and 
lower competitiveness in the world market. In light of the widening economic gap between 
Europe and its main competitors (i.e., the US and Japan) and swiftly growing economies in 
places such as South Korea and China (European Commission (2011), the European Council 
set out the Lisbon Strategy (Lisbon I) in March 2000 (European Council, 2000), which 
offered an economic reform agenda directed toward transforming the European Union into a 
highly competitive and knowledge-based economy by 2010. The knowledge economy has 
remained a leitmotif of all subsequent strategies, including a re-launched Lisbon strategy 
(Lisbon II) (European Commission, 2005) and the Europe 2020 strategy issued in 2010 
(European Commission, 2010). 
The transition to the knowledge economy is driven by a growing recognition that long-
term economic growth, employment, and social welfare are increasingly dependent upon a 
nation’s capacity to generate, appropriate, and use new knowledge (Archibugi & Coco, 2005). 
The technical advances produced by companies and scientific research and transformed into 
commercially viable innovations are perceived as driving the technological changes that 
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produce accumulated technological progress at the aggregate level, which in turn generates 
economic growth and social prosperity for the nation. This transition also depends on the 
knowledge triangle of research, education and innovation described within the evolutionary 
theory of technological change (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and “systems of innovation” 
(Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1988) wherein interactions between knowledge, learning and 
business leaders facilitate conditions conducive to innovation.  
In light of these dynamics, European strategic agendas were primarily concerned with setting 
up the policies and institutions necessary to accelerate the transformation of scientific 
research into commercially viable innovations and enhance the quality of the human capital 
available for knowledge creation and application. Since its inception, the Lisbon agenda has 
emphasized that its goals would necessitate enhancements in research infrastructure, including 
research investments in the private business sector and a fundamental transformation of 
education and training efforts throughout Europe. 
Historically, the application of science in industry began in approximately 1850, during the 
second industrial revolution. During that time, industrial production began to change 
dramatically because technology was no longer mostly empirical and became grounded in 
science. The systematic application of scientific research and methods in industrial production 
(primarily in the areas of physics and chemistry) created the chemical and electrical 
industries, the first “industries of knowledge” (Rosenberg, 1985; Mokyr, 2003). Since then, 
industry has undergone a process of “scientification”, drawing heavily upon the existing pool 
of knowledge and infrastructures provided by science (Dasgupta and David, 1988; Rosenberg 
and Nelson, 1994). The process behind industry’s scientification is usually illustrated using a 
“transistor model” that demonstrates the dependence of new technological paradigms on 
scientific breakthroughs and knowledge resulting from organized and institutionalized 
research within industry (Nelson, 1959). Such knowledge is based on the codification of 
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scientific and engineering research results and the formal (i.e., university) education required 
for understanding them and their application.  
Preposition 1. Knowledge economy was steered by research-driven companies that followed 
the science to make innovations and gain productivity from R&D. 
 
 
Nowadays, the knowledge economy is related to the third industrial revolution, the 
information and biotechnology revolution that began in the US in the 1950s. In contrast with 
the first knowledge industries, where establishing the engineering disciplines at universities 
and the first industrial institutes within large corporations played a crucial role, in modern 
knowledge industries (i.e., the computer and biotechnological industries), the direct 
capitalization of scientific research through small academic spin-off companies has been key. 
Academic entrepreneurship began with ICT companies (primarily Hewlett-Packard (HP) and 
precursors such as Digital Equipment Corporations (DEC)), which then paved the way for 
Silicon Valley, the entire U.S. computer industry and the information age. A similar process 
marked the beginning of the biotechnological industry, whose foundations go back to another 
university spinoff company, Genentech, which was founded to allow for commercial 
exploitation of recombinant DNA, which was discovered in 1973 by scientists at the 
University of California and Stanford University (Hughes, 2011). The spectacular stock 
market success of biotech firms in the early 1980s demonstrated the economic value of 
university research and dramatically changed its role in economic development forever. 
Subsequently, learned skills become distinctive resources as they are the product of 
their accretion and exploitation.  
Preposition 2. Entrepreneurship arises when revolutionizing or reforming the pattern 
of production, exploiting an innovation or an untried technology for producing a new 
commodity, producing an old product in a new way, or a new outlet for products, or 
reorganizing the industry emerge. 
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In the Theory of Economic Development (1934), Joseph Schumpeter describes 
destructive creation wherein an entrepreneur as an innovator disturbs economic equilibrium 
by creating new opportunities for socioeconomic development during times of uncertainty, 
change and technological upheaval. Hereafter, a firm must engage in product, process and 
organisational innovation to capitalize on perceived opportunities (Schumpeter, 1934). 
According to Kirzner (1973) innovation does not require macro-economic changes related to 
new technology or social trends, but entrepreneur is an arbitrageur who obtains profits from 
information asymmetries in incumbent markets that can be captured if discovered before 
others. Innovation is at the core of entrepreneurial activity and it integrate entrepreneurship, 
and institutional and network theories thereby explaining how partnerships enrich localised 
knowledge, social embeddedness within compound informal networks and ambidexterity in 
dealing with various stakeholder groups (Hitt, Ireland, and Lee, 2000).  
Innovation is understood as an interactive process which refers to the behaviour  
of an enterprise in planning and implementing changes to their activities (Nauwelaers, 
Wintjes, 2002). Culture values within organisation (Turro, Urbano and Peris-Ortiz, 2014) or 
knowledge sharing relationships typically need to be stronger the more complex the 
innovation. Research activity itself has undergone two organizational phases:1) the 
institutionalization of R&D within formal R&D departments at large firms, and 2) the 
expropriation of research results by small high-technology companies (usually university 
spin-offs), which is common today. Growth in the number of small- and medium-sized 
technology companies emphasizes the fundamental role entrepreneurial capital plays 
(Audretsch, 2009) in sustaining the current knowledge economy. The role of entrepreneurs in 
transforming theoretical cognition and research results into productive knowledge (Block, 
Thurik and Zhou, 2013 distinguishes the current version of the knowledge economy from its 
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original form. Today, to persist in the global economy, the knowledge economy requires a 
synergy between knowledge capital and entrepreneurship capital. 
 
3. The conceptual roots of the concept of the knowledge economy 
 
Changes in material production that promote a knowledge-based economy have occurred 
alongside the creation of a rich body of economic theories after the Second World War that 
tend to integrate science, technology and the economy. They include economic growth 
theories (Solow, 1957; Romer, 1989), catch-up theories (Abramowitz, 1989), theories of 
technological capabilities (Lall, 1995) and technological accumulation (Bell and Pavitt, 1993) 
among others. At the simplest level, these theories perceive scientific research that has been 
transformed into commercially viable innovations and technological advances as the principal 
drivers of technological change, which in turn produce the accumulated technological 
progress that generates economic growth.  
Prepositions 3. Neoclassical growth theories itself have not offered any practical solutions 
for capitalizing on knowledge or turning knowledge into innovation so need for more policy 
oriented approach arise. 
 
 
A breakthrough occurred with the discovery of technical change within Solow’s Nobel prize-
winning exogenous growth model (Solow, 1957), which perceived non-material production 
factors such as R&D and education as primarily responsible for economic growth. Unlike the 
Solow model, which treats technology like “manna from heaven” that pours into human work 
and makes it more productive (Petit, 1995), new growth theories (Romer, 1989) suggest that 
deliberate investment in endogenous factors such as human capital and scientific research 
capture new knowledge and translate it into goods that enable unbounded economic growth. 
Both of these concepts influenced governments during the 1960s and 1990s, encouraging 
them to invest in scientific research as the “prime mover” of new technologies. It honestly 
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believes by some that the Evolutionary theory may be an appropriate frame-of-reference to 
examine knowledge based economy to the European goals stream in the 21
st
 century.  
Inspired by the economic recession at the end of the 1970s, the evolutionary theory of 
technological change defined some best practices that policymakers could use to foster 
innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Dosi and Nelson 1994). They emphasise radical 
technological innovations made during that time, and particularly the microelectronic 
revolution, as critical in solving that economic crisis. The coevolution of technologies, firms 
and industry structures and their supporting governing institutions were perceived as critical 
for generating innovation (Nelson, 2007). In contrast with neoclassical growth theories, which 
are based on a linear innovation process that begins with scientific research and ends with its 
successful commercialisation, evolutionary economists see innovation as an interactive 
process that paves the way for a non-linear interactive model of innovation, which Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986) described as a chain-linked model that had far-reaching consequences for 
scientific research’s role in the innovation process. The chain-linked model usually begins 
with the identification of an unfilled market need and involves complex feedback loops 
between all the stages of innovation and their corresponding stakeholders. New knowledge or 
scientific research does not necessarily drive innovation. Instead, the minor modifications, 
improvements and other sorts of incremental innovation produced primarily by engineers (as 
opposed to scientists) are perceived as equally if not more important than research on 
economic growth. Although innovation still relies heavily upon technological knowledge, the 
chain-linked model marks, in practice, a break with the concept of science-based innovation.  
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4. Towards a Re-conceptualization of the Knowledge Economy 
 
In the final decades of 20th Century, when global competition steadily increased the 
demand for sophisticated science-based innovations, the knowledge economy became 
increasingly identified with industries rooted in research-intensive and high-technology 
sectors. Within these sectors, there were institutionalized research activities taking place in 
the formal R&D departments of large firms that necessitated strong research investments in 
the public and private sectors. In the early 2000s, this science-centric conceptualization of the 
knowledge economy began to change drastically, as it was found to be too narrow 
developmental model for many countries exposed to globalization and “servitization” of 
economy. Moreover, the “scientification” of industry and high-tech sectors were increasingly 
being viewed negatively and became associated with the outdated and discredited linear 
model of innovation.  
Preposition 4. A narrow understanding of the knowledge economy focused solely on high-tech 
sectors has produced at least three types of limitations that conceptually and practically 
constrain opportunities for economic growth in European economies; thus, this model 
required re-conceptualization.  
 
The first limitation relates to the narrow scope of the innovation which encompasses 
research-based innovation but fail to cover a broad range of technological improvements and 
incremental innovations. The second limitation stems from almost exclusively prizing high-
tech sectors and the "glamorous" new technologies, which are difficult to produce even 
among technology leaders and which, in practice, comprise only a small part of economy. The 
third limitation pertains to the geographical concentration of research and technological 
capabilities within a small number of countries. In the case of Europe, only three 
Scandinavian countries invest more than 3 % of their GDP in R&D and can be considered 
research-driven economies. These limitations are compounded by the difficulties in material 
production produced by globalization and de-industrialization (which occurred with the 
12 
 
collapse of traditional industries), relocation of industry to low-wage countries and the 
saturation of markets with goods of all sorts. The global financial crisis coupled with steep 
unemployment in manufacturing professions and the rise of service sectors have also 
highlighted the limitations of this narrow understanding of the knowledge economy. 
It is quite clear that there are just a few high-technology sectors (Mendoca, 2009), and 
the cumulative impact of incremental innovations and subsequent improvements in more 
“radical-innovations” can have an economic impact (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). However, 
traditional industries have faced downsizing, too, due to the decreased need for manufacturing 
and human labor, Asian imports and related phenomena such as the saturation of markets with 
branded consumer goods. 
Routines are a key concept in the evolutionary theory. Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 
399) define them as a “set of ways of doing things and ways of determining what to do” by 
wounding across the concepts of capabilities (techniques that firms use) and choices 
(behaviours that can be optimized). Within this narrow conceptualisation of the knowledge 
economy, many countries are excluded from the global technology race and expelled from the 
club of developed modern knowledge economies. Therefore, it was necessary to re-formulate, 
expand and soften the original concept of the knowledge economy (Carayannis et al, 2014). 
The service and creative economies have been increasingly favoured as potential platforms 
for future economic growth and employment (OECD, 2000), but it is not clear to what extent 
this trend is based on these economies’ actual impact on economic growth, as opposed to 
uncertainty regarding how the national economy will sustain and progress. 
  Standard theories of technical change and technological progress based on industrial 
and technological innovation have been challenged by various types of soft innovations (e.g., 
organizational, social, or market) that increasingly blur the boundaries between the production 
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and service sectors. There is a common perception that innovation is in crisis while the 
“future trends in innovation in most developed countries are uncertain” (OECD, 2012).  
However, abandoning the “unrealistic” notion that science-based innovation could 
drive growth in the majority of countries has produced an unexpected result:  the intangibles 
of scientific research that previously drove technological progress have been replaced by the 
intangibles of services and consumer innovations. Freeman and Soete (2007:12) concluded, 
for example, that technological progress has been more recently associated with knowledge 
service activities such as continuous attempts at ICT-based efficiency improvements in areas 
such as the financial and insurance sectors, the wholesale and retail sectors, health, education, 
government services, business management and administration.  
The substitution of “service intangibles” for “knowledge intangibles” revises the 
original notion of innovation and enables the replacement of the knowledge economy with the 
service economy. The evolution of the concept of innovation and the knowledge economy are 
most visible, although still not dominant, within the frameworks of the creative and culture 
economies, which identify knowledge with creativity. The jump from scientific creativity to 
creativity in various other creative sectors is visible in the domains of entertainment, personal 
consumption and dematerialized consumer innovations such as Facebook, Twitter or 
Instagram. 
This re-conceptualization started within mainstream economics, which abolished the 
classic definition of innovation as “the first application of science and technology in a new 
way, with commercial successes” (OECD, 1971:11) in favor of much broader one based on 
the Kline Rosenberg chain-linked model of innovation, which takes into account the non-
technological aspects of innovation (Adam, 2014:9). From a practical point of view, the 
Frascati manual (OECD, 2002), which measured research inputs into innovation, was 
complemented by the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005:46), which focused on innovation outputs 
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(Godin, 2011) and, in its latest edition, has broadened the definition of innovation to include 
organizational and marketing to ensure that policymakers take non-technological aspects of 
innovation into account (Godin, 2008). 
This is not to deny the need for a broader definition of innovation that encompasses 
various types of non-research-based and incremental innovations (which are achieved 
primarily by growing sector of small firms), but rather, to demonstrate how deemphasizing 
technology innovation paved the way for re-conceptualizing the intangibles that represent the 
substance of the knowledge economy. This revised definition of innovation has been applied 
in composing the Community Innovation Survey, the European Commission’s official 
instrument for measuring the innovation performance of its member states. The latest survey 
(CIS 6) reveals that marketing or organizational innovation prevailed over product or process 
innovation (Uppenberg and  Strauss, 2010). 
Furthermore, the chief models that the European Commission uses for reporting on state-of-
the-art of innovation performance among EU members—the Innovation Union Scoreboard 
(IUS) and its predecessor, the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS)—are both focused on a 
rather colorful and arbitrary compilation of indictors that have been roundly criticized (Adam, 
2014). These models assume that all indicators have an equal effect on national innovation 
performance, regardless of their technological embeddedness or research intensity. They 
reflect a general departure from the original concept of knowledge economy towards a 
changed conception that relativizes the importance of R&D and technological innovation in 
economic growth. 
5. What is knowledge in the knowledge economy? 
 
The most challenging question is how service innovation (and not technological 
innovation) came to be uncritically accepted as the primary driver of economic growth. This 
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historical turnaround has resulted in the privileging of different types of current intangible 
economies that more or less ignore scientific research and technology as factors in growth and 
employment. These economies change the original notion of the knowledge economy, 
enabling it to evolve into more intangible or light economy. Several examples of these 
intangible economies can be identified (Author, 2012):  the new ICT-based economy (OECD, 
2000a), the weightless economy (Coyle, 1997; Quah, 1999), the creative economy (Howkins, 
2001), the cultural economy (Hesmondhalgh, 2013), the financialized economy (Krippner, 
2005:174) and the service economy (Maglio, Kieliszewski and Spohrer, 2010).  
Today, the service economy tends to be viewed as a replacement for the knowledge 
economy, which creates many socio-economic changes whose full consequences remain 
unknown. However, a problem arises when trying to define what the "knowledge" referred to 
in these different types of intangible knowledge economies actually is. A short overview of 
the main drivers for each one can help define their specific knowledge bases and illustrate the 
substantial difference between the original knowledge economy and its successors. 
Preposition 5. The service–type economies provide a new epoch of the knowledge economy 
but it cannot be equated with it. 
 
The economies listed previously are notable for their post-industrial character and lack 
of emphasis on material (i.e., primarily industrial) production in favor of other intangible 
factors. In such economies, company assets do not consist of “land, labor and machinery” but 
rather the creativity, knowledge, skills, learning, information, intellectual property rights, 
good will, ideas and other similar soft factors that, in fact, underpin the original concept of the 
knowledge economy as well.  
The new economy is often equated with the Internet economy, whose origins lie in the 
foundation of Natscape (Kogut, 2004:2) and its very successful IPO in 1995. To Godin 
(2004), the concept of the new economy arose from the growth project (OECD, 2000a) 
16 
 
inspired by the strong economic performance of the United States in the 1990s. Although the 
popularity of the new economy faded somewhat after the crash of the Internet bubble in 2000, 
ICT has revolutionized most areas of economic and social life and today determines the path 
of economic growth (Kushida, and Zeeman, 2009).  The attitudes about the role of R&D in 
ICT are conflicting. Although it is commonly accepted that the ICT sector is highly intensive 
in research and development (García-Muñiz and Vicente, 2014) others hold that contribution 
of the ICT sectors to European countries in the period 2000-2005 was weakening and slowing 
economic growth due to the loss of export advantages and technical change related to the 
lower intensity of the R&D activities and weaker linkage to the other emerging countries, 
especially in Asia” (Rohman, 2013, p.396). The new ICT based economy provides a ground 
of the knowledge economy but it cannot be equated with it. 
The concept of the weightless economy is  pioneered by Danny Quah (1999) whose 
understanding of dematerialized economy was quite different from the standard perception  of 
knowledge economy driven by high-tech and scientific research. He challenges the idea that 
knowledge in economic life is always identical with knowledge in science and technology. 
The weightless economy is characterized by “knowledge-products, i.e., commodities whose 
physical properties resemble those of knowledge, regardless of whether the commodities 
themselves contain significant amounts of knowledge as traditionally understood“(Quah, 
1999:2). The weightless economy draws strength from consumers who are not ivory-tower 
academics or managers but rather, for the most part, ordinary people who are “caught by 
globalization pushed hard against the chalkface of technical progress“(Quah, 1999a). The 
main value of commodity comes, it is argued, from its “'weightless” attributes derived from 
its design, its brand, image, the way in which it is marketed or individualized to the 
customers’ desire. Besides the Quah’s influential works, the book by D. Coyle (1997) “The 
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Weightless World” is referred to as the first book to map an economic world that has been 
turned upside down by digital technology and global business.” 
Preposition 6. Creativity and introduction of new business models are the most meaningful 
source required for growth. Cultural and creativity-based competition is highly attractive 
since it is abundant by jobs and does not require long-term technological accumulation, 
painstaking learning, large investments or mastery of advanced technical skills in the natural 
and technical sciences. Even the least developed country has a chance to compete by virtue of 
its brainpower or, to use a broader term, human creativity. However, its sustainability and 
consequences on growth remain unknown.  
In contrast with the weightless economy, whose influence on economic theory and 
practice has been limited, the cultural economy (Hesmondhalgh, 2013) and creative 
economy (Florida, 2002; Howkins, 2001) have exploded, transitioning from representing a 
relatively insignificant portion of economic life to becoming major players in advanced 
economies since the 2000s, when culturalization of the economy become a key to success in 
crowded and competitive markets (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009).  
These economies’ strengths include 1) annual growth rates of between 5% and 20% in 
cultural industries, as estimated in OECD countries and 2) their huge potential to create 
employment, exports and growth (European Commission, 2005a). The expected economic 
benefits of culturalization are rooted in the nature of cultural and creative activities, which are 
labor intensive, foster innovation and individual entrepreneurialism, and are widespread (as 
they do not depend on an individual’s specific technical, scientific or expert abilities). 
Regardless of the semantic, historical and conceptual differences between these industries 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2008), the creative and cultural economies include a colorful bundle of 
artistic sectors such as the visual arts (e.g., painting and sculpture); performing arts (e.g., 
theatre and opera); heavily industrialized sectors such as advertising and marketing; software; 
broadcasting; film; the Internet; fashion; design; artistic crafts; and architecture, as well as 
research and scientific activities. The early effort of the European Commission to analyze the 
socio-economic impact of the cultural sector in Europe has resulted in a comprehensive study 
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„The Economy of Culture in Europe” (European Commission, 2006) and since then has 
become a part of the regular monitoring within the Extension of the European Cluster 
Observatory. The latest report emphasizes the great significance of cultural and creative 
industries for economic growth in the EU and promotes rhetoric that “innovation is 
increasingly driven by non-technological factors such as creativity, design and new 
organizational processes or business models” (European Commission, 2013a:13). 
The weightless, creative and cultural economic models suggest that individuals are 
able to earn livelihoods and even grow wealthy simply by using their spirit, creativity and 
new ideas to produce immaterial (as opposed to physical) products. In fact, the 
aforementioned economies do not acknowledge an essential economic difference between 
scientific/technological knowledge and the products of the human spirit; scientific 
breakthroughs and mathematical theorems are judged as equivalent to human creations such 
"trash" TV shows, blockbusters and rock concerts in terms of their impact on socio-economic 
development. To Quah (1999a:6), for example, „Lara Croft Tomb Raider is a weightless 
knowledge-product that we enjoy or we sell - its economic and physical properties make it a 
prototypical product in the new hi-tech knowledge-intensive economy“.  
It cannot be denied that the weightless, cultural and creative economies are rather 
appealing by virtue of their “non-elitist" character and independence from high technology, 
which excludes less economically and technologically, developed countries from current 
global economic trends. Opponents of the weightless economy point to a lack of evidence that 
creative economies are sustainable or can solve the problem of unemployment and falling 
production by promoting the creation of low-paid, low-skilled jobs (Oakley, 2004; Witt, 
2013) and  neglect of knowledge based services (Miles, 2005) in parallel. Moreover, 
encouraging the acquisition of trivial skills can bring about a number of negative 
consequences and unintended social and cultural phenomena, such changes in value systems, 
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lifestyle, or work ethic or social exclusion (i.e., by broadening the gap between the low-skill 
jobs and techno-managerial elites). 
The erosion of the knowledge economy has been accelerated by the appearance of the 
financialised economy, in which “profit making occurs increasingly through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (Kripner, 2005:174). Although 
this phenomenon cannot be elaborated upon here, it should be noted that financialization 
further eroded the concept of the knowledge economy because many have attributed the 
intangibles inherent to the financial sector (e.g., securities, bonds, and premiums) and the 
negative features of financialization (such as public debts or the real estate bubble) to the 
knowledge economy as the dominant socio-economic paradigm in which we presently live.  
6. A Roadmap for Addressing the Knowledge Economy to Service Economy 
 
The evolution of the concept of research-driven innovation and change of the original 
notion of the knowledge economy culminated in the appearance of the service economy. 
Service economy is implicitly equated with knowledge economy because the investment in 
intangibles such as research and innovation is simply identified with the investment in 
services as just another form of intangible intellectual or mind production. Since technological 
progress have diminished the need for manufacturing and human labor many politicians 
strongly support services as a way to combat unemployment and the overall difficulties 
caused by globalization and de-industrialization. However, the global financial crisis helped 
to expose the hidden weaknesses and the deep–rooted conflicts inherent to the service 
economy. Growing social and economic inequalities, persistently rising unemployment, the 
weaker competitive position of most EU countries and a lack of perceived gains in wellbeing 
are some illustrative examples. It is estimated, for example, that 114 million people in the EU 
20 
 
(i.e., 23 % of the EU population) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2009 
(European Commission, 2011a).  
A modest but growing number of analyses argue that it is necessary to pay more 
attention to deconstructing the myth of service economy (Jansson, 2009; Oakley, 2004; 
Ketokivi, 2009), including its structural deficiencies (Wölfl, 2005) and the fallacy (Solberg 
Søilen, 2012) arguing that the service economy is not sustainable in the long run.  
Preposition 7. The processes of learning and research in service innovation are quite 
different from those found in industrial innovation, which is based primarily on the 
achievements and methods of the natural, technical, and biotechnical sciences and 
engineering. 
 
Some argue that the service economy is nothing but a statistical illusion, a myth of 
high-tax welfare states (Jansson, 2009) generated by mistakenly dividing the economy into 
goods and services instead of according to the nature (i.e., material or immaterial) of the final 
output. The latter method reveals the dependence of services on production and reimagines 
the conventional share of services and goods in the economy (Jansson, 2009:186). A 
significant portion of the service sector is composed of the health, education and social care 
sectors (HEC), which are basically provided free of charge (the services under its umbrella are 
funded either by market-based services or manufacturing). The growth of low-value-added 
services threaten the  HEC and welfare state, a fact that is already evident in less developed 
countries with small production bases. Above all, overestimation of services threatens the 
research and education sectors, which are mostly funded by constantly declining public 
resources, and therefore diminishes the basis of the knowledge economy. 
Services are often perceived as characterized by low knowledge intensity (Wölfl, 
2005) while, by contrast, modern manufacturing (not only in high-tech industries, but also 
low- and medium-tech ones) creates and deploys many forms of knowledge that are relevant 
for production, including basic science results (Hirsch-Kreinsen, et al, 2003). Service 
innovations reduce the need for R&D and education, particularly in technical and scientific 
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fields, and thereby lessen the “epistemic base of technique” (Mokyr, 2003). R&D and 
manufacturing are physically collocated and a tendency for unbundling them (for example, by 
relocating production to low-wage countries) is possible for some companies but for many 
others is simply a post-industrial myth (Ketokivi, 2009). 
With the exception of knowledge-based, highly professional services such as those 
found in the financial or health care sectors, service innovations primarily require low–wage, 
low-skill, routinized work and thus lead to the deskilling or ‘McDonaldization’ of society  
(Gatta at all,  2005). Coupled with a number of unemployed in the EU that hits a new height 
of 26.9 million in September 2013 (European Commission 2013b:36) it leads to the 
precarious and a non-standard “flexible” employment that is poorly paid, insecure and 
unprotected (Standing, 2011). Coyle (1997) states that much of the growth in jobs will occur 
in sectors within the social economy, such as individual communities, social and personal 
services, charities, etc. which was confirmed by the share of 29 % of GDP expenditures in the 
EU on social protection recorded in  2011 (Eurostat, 2013). 
In Europe, according to Eurostat
2
 the proportion of low-wage earners has been either 
in the steady state or increased over the period 2006-2010 in many countries, especially the 
old western economies, such as the UK, Austria, Germany and Italy. The highest proportion 
of low-wage earners among the employed are in the services sectors, such as accommodation 
and chattering (44%), administration (40%), and wholesale (25%), followed by the arts 
(23%), real estate (13%), industry (13%) and, ICT (5%). 
In analyzing the U.S.’s competitiveness in the knowledge economy, Tassey (2004) 
draws several conclusions that are important for considering the role of research and 
education in the knowledge-based economy. First, knowledge-based services, which are 
usually perceived as a way to escape economic stagnation, are at risk due to decreases in 
                                                             
2 Eurostat table code: earn_ses_pub1s 
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production, as they typically represent the final stage in a system of products related to 
consumption (e.g., communication, marketing, or trade). Second, manufacturing is critical to 
an advanced economy’s long-term growth and will continue to be so for the foreseeable 
future. Third, companies must conduct R&D to create or absorb technologies from external 
resources. Additionally, industry has important spillover effects because it is based on 
constantly emerging new technologies and innovations and, therefore, encourages scientific 
research, technological accumulation and learning. Overreliance on services leads to a vicious 
circle in which a decline in industry reduces innovation, research capacities and educational 
needs, which in turn has a negative impact on industry.  
R&D and education that are embedded in technological innovation and industrial 
production are still substantial contributors to the material reproduction of economies and 
societies, and they represent critical factors in the knowledge economy (Gambardella and 
McGahan, 2010).However, analyses of the EU’s competitiveness with respect to overall 
research and innovation revealed that it has been progressively declining over the last decade, 
particularly in the private business sector, which is especially worrying (European 
Commission, 2011:15). It is important to stress that, without structural changes in the research 
and innovation sectors (Heger and Rohrbeck 2012), the EU economy and its future economic 
competitiveness with respect to high-value-added products and services may be at risk. That 
said, it is rather encouraging that, after the decades in which industry’s share in the European 
GDP fell sharply, there are broad initiatives for rebuilding the industrial ecosystem (European 
Commission, 2012b). 
 Preposition 8. The knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) and high-and medium-high 
technology manufacturing sectors while of growing importance, remains smaller in the 
aggregate than other parts of the economy; it calls for reconsidering of  scientific research 
and technological innovation for economic growth. 
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According to EUROSTAT the share of knowledge intensive activities (KIAs) 
represents a respectful 35.6% of total employment in EU 28 in 2012 while the share of 
knowledge intensive services (KIS) amounts to 39.2% in 2013.  However, more detailed 
insight reveals that KIA and KIS do not apply the standard criteria of research intensity used 
to define the high to low-tech industries based on R&D expenditures by sectors as defined by 
OECD (2011). By contrast, they involve a colorful bundle of jobs which ranges from more 
creative/cultural activities (e.g. broadcasting, motion picture, entrainment, tour operators) to 
more intellectual activities like information, legal and financial service, etc. Yet these 
activities are presumably quite common and does not require special expertise scientific 
research base.  
On the other hand, knowledge intensive activities in business industry (KIABI) 
including knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) represent a modest 10–25 % of total 
employment in the large majority of EU countries in 2012, with 13.8 % in the EU on 
average
3
.  Similarly the high and medium-high technology manufacturing sectors employ 
only 5.6% of total employment in EU 28 in 2013. These data illustrate the need not only for 
improvement of vague and somehow misleading definition of knowledge intensive sectors but 
also a need for reconsidering the role of scientific research and technological innovation in 
gaining a new momentum to economic growth and social development. 
7. Conclusion 
 
An investigation into the historic and conceptual roots of the knowledge economy 
reveals that the original concept of the knowledge economy in Europe has evolved since the 
2000s due to the  restructuring of global economy from manufacturing towards services 
supported by the paradigm shift in  both the concept of “knowledge economy” in general and  
                                                             
3 Eurostat table code: htec_kia_emp2 
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“knowledge”  in particular. These circumstances have questioned the European Union’s 
ability to transform into a highly competitive knowledge-based economy, but the precise 
cause of the failure is debatable. Analysis has identified several factors that could explain this 
lag in Europe’s international competitiveness. On a general socio-economic level, these 
reasons could include banking system dysfunction; severe fiscal austerity; high debt; 
reductions in key demographics; a decreased demand for goods; declining exports; real estate 
bubbles, etc. (European Commission, 2011). In the specific areas of research and innovation, 
the most common deficits included low investment in R&D, weak innovation capacities, a 
lack of human capital, a low rate of entrepreneurship, a low rate of ICT adoption (European 
Commission, 2011 and 2012a, Johansson et al, 2007).  By contrast, the Knowledge for 
Growth Expert Group (K4G, 2007) concluded that “the R&D deficits appear to be a symptom, 
rather than the cause of weaknesses in the EU’s capacities to innovation”. According to this 
view, deficits in R&D—and, specifically, the shortage of new technology-based entrants in 
the EU—reflect the characteristics and dynamics of an enterprise structure. 
Change in the understanding of the concept of knowledge from scientific knowledge 
to services and creativity has been generated through a plethora of new conceptualization of 
economy such as new/Internet, weightless, cultural, creative or financialised economy which 
are nowadays commonly understood as a part of service economy. Knowledge economy is 
implicitly equated through this evolution with service economy because the investment in 
intangibles such as research and innovation is somewhat uncritically identified with the 
investment in services as just another form of intangibles driven by human intellectual/mind 
production as opposed to industrial production. The exchange of “service intangibles” for 
“knowledge intangibles” transform the original concept of the knowledge economy which 
was rooted in capitalizing on science as a complex non-linear process of technological 
innovation towards the service economy rooted in capitalizing the knowledge intensive 
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activities (KIAs) where knowledge is perceived to be generated not as a product of scientific 
research but as a service or creative activity. However, KIAs are still rather vague concept in 
which the role of scientific research and research based innovation is quite weak, unclear and 
elusive at least perceived through a low proportion of KIABI, KIBS and high- to medium-
high technologies in economy. Therefore, an uncritical overreliance on services without clear 
position of scientific research and technological innovation might further weaken the 
competitive position of the European countries vis-à-vis new emerging economies.  It might 
also create a vicious circle in which a decline in industry generate decline in R&D and 
educational needs, which in turn worsens industry’s decline. This threatens the very 
foundations of the knowledge economy and requires, thus, reconsideration of the role of 
scientific research and technological innovation in both service and industrial sectors to gain a 
new momentum to economic growth and social property. 
  It seems that the new endeavors are needed to encourage European economies to 
transform from low perspective service activities into the knowledge-intensive service 
economy (KISE) with higher proportion of high tech production and high-tech service sectors. 
Such activities could reconcile scientific research, technological innovation and service 
activities needed for dormant knowledge economy to revive. 
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